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1. Introduction 
The relationship between corporate governance structure and institutional investment has evoked much interest 
among researchers. While some studies revealed a positive relationship between the two constructs (see (John and 
Sembet, 1998; Abdullah, 2006; Li et al., 2006; Nguyen and Faff, 2006). Others indicate a negative (Jennings, 2005; 
Wymeersch, 2006; Zubarira, 2006); and still others (Sanda et al., 2005; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Gregory and 
Simmelk, 2007) establish no relationship between  Corporate Governance Structure and Institutional Investment. 
Though a positive relationship between corporate governance, and institutional investment has prevailed in many 
studies (Abarbanell et al., 2003; Ihendinihu, 2009), results still remain inconclusive (Ogbowu, 2014). Such 
inconclusiveness creates ground for further investigation. 
Corporate governance has been the subject of numerous theoretical and empirical studies especially after the 
fraudulent financial reporting scandals such as Enron, world.com, Adelphia, Parmalat, Tyco, AIG, Global crossing, 
HIH Insurance, lever brothers, and the eight Nigerian banks of 2009, have increased attention and concerns about 
corporate governance. These corporate meltdowns raised the consciousness of regulators and policy makers to the 
negligence or weakness of corporate governance/organizations. 
Corporate governance refers broadly to the systems or structures (Internal and external) – processes, rules, 
regulations and control mechanisms – that govern the conduct of an organization for the benefit of all stakeholders. 
An effective corporate governance, for example, creates organizational efficiency by (see (Dockery and Herbert, 
2000)), pacifying the rights and responsibilities of owners (shareholders); employees (Managers and staff) and third 
parties (Woidtke, 2002; Miller, 2004). Balancing shareholder interests with those of other key stakeholder groups, 
including customers, creditors, government and communities (Klapper and Love, 2004); ensuring that the 
organization operates in accordance with the best practices and accepted ethical standards (Aaboan, 2006; Ow-Yong 
and Kooi, 2006); instituting incentive and control techniques to mitigate abuse of corporate power and other 
egregious frictions and distortions within the firm (Sanda et al., 2005). In short, effective or good corporate 
In recent times, the corporate governance structure debate has tended to expand the objective of 
business beyond the maximization of shareholders’ wealth to include discharge of duty to the society. 
This study examines the influence of corporate governance structure and institutional investment of 
32 listed companies on the NSE, covering the period of 2006-2010. The postulated hypotheses were 
tested, using multiple linear regression (MLR) analysis. The empirical results showed no significant 
influence between corporate governance and institutional investors. Rather, institutional investors 
exert a significant and, positive influence on corporate governance structure. The studies advocate 
that given more attention to the large institutional investment, since there is a positive relationship 
between corporate governance structure and the whole number of institutional investors. And a 
negative influence between corporate governance structure and volume of institutional investors.  To 
have better monitoring by large institutional investors, they should set up board of investee 
companies in order to have wider bird’s view image the capital market authority and NSE should set 
regulations that prevent a percentage holding of share in the companies to protect the control by few 
institutional investors. The study also recommends further investigations into the influence of 
corporate governance structure and institutional investors, using larger sample size, covering more 
years, and including particularly the banking sectors that has witnessed major reforms since 2005 
and plays a critical role in the economic development of Nigeria. 
 
      Keywords: Corporate governance structure, Developing country, Institutional investment, Number of institutional 
investors, Value of institutional investors, Nigeria, Quoted companies. 
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governance is the joining of both the letter and spirit of the law to achieve all of the above (see also (Moshirian et al., 
2006; Carleton et al., 2007; Javed and Iqbal, 2007; Blanca et al., 2009)). 
Despite these governance and rapid changes regarding who owns firms and how they go about imposing pressure 
on boards and managers to act in specific ways, our empirical knowledge of the effect of different forms of firm 
owners and how they affect firm outcomes is advancing rather slowly  especially in emerging economics. The 
introduction of institutional investors in Nigeria programme raises empirical concerns. First, as a new phenomenon, 
there is no literature evidence of its adoption in any other country companies’ policy. Consequently, the institutional 
inventors’ model has not been subjected to any empirical analysis to determine its superior performance efficacy vis-
à-vis extent models used hitherto in Nigeria and in other climes. Although the investors’ method bears some of the 
characteristics of Brada (1996) second and third methods, there are however distinguishing features. Although, we 
shall empirically differ a more complete statement of the institutional investor organizational framework until section 
2.3, suffice it observe here that under the Nigerian listed companies policy, on investor is characterized as one who 
possess the simultaneous complementarily technical know-how (Ihendinihu, 2009) financial capacity (Maxwell, 
2011) managerial competence (Nwaiwu and Dan Jumbo, 2014) to turn around the fortunes of the companies. On the 
relationship between corporate governance and institutional investment in Nigeria, the mixed evidence inherent in 
previous studies (see (AdenikinJu and Ayovinde, 2001; Sanda et al., 2005; Ogbowu, 2014) makes further empirical 
investigation imperative. 
The aim of this paper is to empirically bring to the mainstream of the study of corporate governance analysis, the 
stylized institutional investors. In the 1990’s, Nigeria started the experimentation of institutional investors model 
ostensibly as a panacea to the unrelenting corporate governance and performance failures in the country’s quoted 
companies. This study delineates the conceptual and practical issues in corporate governance and evaluates its 
institutional efficacy as both as ownership structure and corporate governance mechanism. Through this, we seek to 
enrich the existing literature by bringing into the mainstream discourse and testing the hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between corporate governance and institutional investment drawing on the experience of Nigeria. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section two provides the theoretical framework and review 
the literature related to the phenomenon of interest. Section three presents the methodology, section four analyses the 
data and discusses the results while section five concludes the paper and makes recommendations. 
 
2. Review of Related Literature 
2.1. Theoretical Framework 
The contextual background to the study of Corporate Governance Structure generally is traceable to international 
concerns about the possible adverse consequences of the separation of ownership rights and control rights in a 
modern corporation. Smith (1776) provides the antecedent framework in this regard, followed by Veblen (1924) who 
canvassed for the transfer of control from capital – owners to engineer – managers in the belief that such would lead 
to consequential growth and economic importance of diffuse corporate ownership. However, systematic inquires into 
the effect of Corporate Governance Structure on the value of institutional investors and number of institutional 
investors are rooted in the seminal works of Berle and Means (1932) whose concern was on the adverse effect of the 
separation of owners and control on institutional investment of firms. These early concerns set the tone and context 
for modern explication of the agency perspective and systematic enquiry into the influence of Corporate Governance 
Structure on investment outcomes. 
The agency theory postulates behavioural attribute of the economic man with respect to transactional 
characteristics as a devious, self-interest seeking being with divergent, opportunistic and suboptimal pursuit different 
from efficiency goal pursuit of the firm (Dockery and Herbert, 2000). The corporate activities in the corporate 
governance structure in corporate reporting literature is that absent monitoring and other incentive stratagems, 
managers are likely to promote opportunism with guide, display sensitivity to divergent expectations and other 
expose manifestations of moral hazard to the atmospheric detriment of the firm. The theory further maintains that 
maximization of firm value/performance will be infeasible under managerial discretions that provide opportunities to 
expropriate wealth (Turnball, 1997). For organizational benefits to be realized require that incentives, monitoring and 
regulatory devices be institutionalized to checkmate egregious managerial excesses. Violation of Governance 
principles can create internal market frictions and moral hazards and these can be mitigated by a strong corporate 
activity which is often a reflection of firms’ institutional investment. 
 
3. Nature and Concept of Corporate Governance Structure 
Corporate governance structure broadly refers to the systems or structures (Internal and External) – processes, 
rules, regulations and control mechanisms – that govern the conduct of an organization for the benefits of all 
stakeholders. An effective corporate governance structure, for example, creates organizational efficiency by (a) 
specifying the rights and responsibilities of all stakeholders, to  it: owners (shareholders), employees (managers and 
staff) and third parties, (b) balancing shareholder interests with those of other key stakeholders groups, including  
customers, creditors, government and communities (c) ensuring that the organization operates in accordance with the 
best practices and accepted ethical standards; and (d) instituting incentive and control techniques to mitigate abuse of 
corporate power and other egregious frictions and distortions within the firm. In short, effective or good corporate 
governance is the joining of both the letter and spirit of the law to achieve all of the above (see also (Sanda et al., 
2005; Carleton et al., 2007; Javed and Iqbal, 2007)). 
An important objective of corporate governance structure, therefore, is to secure accountability of corporate 
managers as shareholder’s agents who are provided with authority and incentives to promote wealth-creating 
strategies (Dockery and Herbert, 2000). There is, therefore a strong connection between corporate governance 
structure and institutional investors because the former is considered to be one of the core governance mechanisms 
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along with others such as, debt structure, board structure, incentive-based compensation structure, dividend structure, 
and external auditing (Faro et al., 2007). 
The need for corporate governance derives from the “expectation gap” problem which arises when the behaviour 
of corporate enterprise falls short of the shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ expectation (Achua, 2002). Sanda et 
al. (2005) attribute the phenomenal pre-eminence accorded to corporate governance recently to the increasing 
incidence of corporate fraud and corporate collapse on a previously unimagined scale; the dominance of the 
corporation in modern business, occasioned principally by privatization and consolidations; the collapse of socialism 
and centralized planning and; greedy bosses. 
The variety of corporate governance structures commonly investigated in extant literature includes the 
dominant/largest shareholders, diffuse versus concentrated, insider (board or managerial) ownership, institutional 
owner. The focus of the present study is on corporate governance structure and institutional investment have 
emerged as the preferred governance mechanisms in Nigeria’s differing and conflicting  policies on corporate 
governance through the indigenization programmes (see (Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), 1972 & 1999)). 
 
4. Empirical Studies 
The influence of corporate governance structure and institutional investment has been a subject of several 
empirical investigations since the seminal work of Berle and Means (1932). Many empirical studies have 
documented a positive and significant effect (Hartzell and Sturks, 2002), others’ negative effect (Gompers et al., 
2003), and some mixed and significant effect between corporate governance structure and institutional investment 
(Claessen and Fan, 2002; Bushee and Noe, 2004). The average conclusion from these studies is that corporate 
governance structure influences institutional investment. However, contrarian view’s surfaced from Firth (1985) and 
Johnson et al. (1995) in New Zealand, Simon et al. (1992) in Malaysia, and Carson et al. (2003) in Australia, 
Ogbowu (2014) in Nigeria, among others about the influence of institutional investment and corporate governance. 
The findings of these studies do not have positive relationship between institutional investment and corporate 
governance structure.  In fact, Carson et al. (2003) aver that institutional investments do not linearly influence 
corporate governance structure. But Ogbowu (2014) argues that institutional investment influence corporate 
governance, even when there are no distinguishable differences in literature. So far, there appears to be no consistent 
or discernible empirical evidence about the direction of the influence between corporate governance structure and 
institutional investment or institutional investment and corporate governance. In the light of this, more empirical 
evidence or further research is warranted, especially from developing and less developed countries (DLDCs) 
geographical contexts, in particular sub-Saharan African countries that have witnessed very little research in this area 
(Bushee et al., 2007; Bushee and Goodman, 2007). 
Although, empirical literature of most relevant studies examining this effect with their authors are display in 
webometric analysis in terms of the sample, variables, methodology and results. This seeks to add to the stock of 
knowledge on the phenomenon of interest. 
Other than these empirical works, surveys have been conducted by various organizations to evaluate the effect 
between the two issues corporate governance and institutional investors. A study performed by credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia. (CISA) in 2002 indicates the existence of the positive link between corporate governance on almost 
500 developing economy companies. In a prior study conducted in 2001, CLSA generated on index for 495 firms 
from 25 emerging markets to find out their corporate “governance rankings. This report demonstrated that firms that 
rank high in this index display better operating and marketing performance.  
Another striking and more recent research was performed by the Association of British Insurers (ABI) in 2008. 
The aim of that study was to address the two main questions of whether corporate governance enhances institutional 
investors and whether corporate governance creates value for the UK listed companies. That study utilized a total of 
654 companies with 2007 firm-year observations during the period between 2004 and 2007. The results were 
positive in terms of the influence between the governance system of the firm and it investors. The companies that 
demonstrated the best governance records were found to outperform others by generating 18% higher investors. 
Other findings showed that a breach of governance best practice led to about one percentage point decline in the 
firms’ industry adjusted number of investment. 
 
Table-4.1. Webometric Analysis of Corporate Governance Structure research. 
S/N Author/year Sample Explanatory 
variable 
Dependent 
variable 
Methodology Results 
1 Mehdi (2007) 24 Tunisian 
firms 
 (2000-2005) 
Corporate  
Governance 
 Structure 
Institutional  
investment  
Panel  
Regression 
 Model 
Evidence of a strong relationship 
between governance and 
institutional investment. 
2 Mashcyekhi and 
Buzaz (2008) 
240 Tehran firms 
 (2005-2006) 
Corporate  
governance  
mechanism 
Number of  
institutional  
investors 
Multiple  
regression  
analysis 
Board size is negatively 
associated with institutional 
investors. 
3 Brown and 
Caylor (2006) 
2363 firms 
 (2003) 
51 individual  
Governance 
 factor 
Number and  
value of  
institutional 
 investors 
OLS  
Regression 
 Analysis 
Ten of 51 governance provisions 
are positively and significantly 
related to at least one of our two 
investors’ measures. 
4 Freeman and 
Reed (2010) 
20 Californian 
 firm  
1999-2003 
A New  
perspective on  
corporate 
 governance  
Volume  
and  
percentage 
 holdings of 
 institutional 
 investment 
Manu  
Whitney 
 U “test” 
No significant relationship 
between corporate governance 
and volume of institutional 
investors and positive 
relationship between corporate 
governance and percentage 
holdings. 
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5 Blanca et al. 
(2009) 
21 non-listed 
 firms Spain 
Outsider on the 
 board of 
 directors 
Institutional 
 investors 
Multiple  
Regression 
 Analysis 
A positive relationship between 
outsider on board of directors 
and institutional investors. 
6 Kurt (2012) 55 listed  
Companies 
in Illinois 
Ownership  
structure, audit 
 independence 
Institutional 
 investors 
OLS  
Regression 
Ownership structure and audit 
independence have significant 
positive influence on 
institutional investors. 
7 Theo et al. 
(2013) 
40 Groningen 
 companies  
Board  
composition 
Institutional 
 investors 
OLS 
 Regression 
Find support for a negative 
influence between  the board  
composition and  institutional 
investors 
8 Ogbowu (2014) 32 listed  
companies in  
Nigeria  
2004-2008 
Board size, 
 Board  
independence,  
shareholders  
representative  
in Audit  
committee, 
 size of Audit  
committee,  
Audit  
committee 
 Independence 
Number,  
volume  
and  
percentage 
 holdings 
Multiple 
 Regression 
 Analysis 
Bard size have a significant 
influence on number of 
institutional investors and Board 
independence, shareholders 
representative in audit 
committee, size of audit 
committee and audit committee 
independence have positive 
influence on institutional 
investors. 
 
The major reason why the presence of institutional investors in a firm ownership structure is taken into account 
in this study is due to the significance of these investors in corporate practices. Based on Mckinsey & company’s 
2002 survey, institutional investors are found to prefer investing in companies with sound corporate governance 
structure. Therefore, we try to provide. 
 
5. Corporate Governance and Institutional Investors 
Corporate governance has recently received much attention due to Adelphia, Enron, world.com, failed eight 
Nigerian banks, and other high profit scandals, serving as the impetus to such recent U.S. regulations as the Sarbanes 
– Oxley Act of 2002, considered to be the most sweeping corporate governance regulation in the past years, and 
enhancing the long standing bandwagon for increasing shareholder power, according to (Hugghebaert and Hulle, 
2004), corporate governance concerns the development of performing to structures in corporate organization. One of 
the important dimensions of corporate governance is the creation of effective monitoring of managers, voting by 
shareholders is a legal exercise for monitoring management. Regularly, many questions have been raised if 
institutional investors should be assigned to an influential role in corporate governance. 
During the past decades, institutional investors become increasingly important as shareholders. There are two 
views about institutional investors activism, the one is active monitoring. The opposite view is represented by the 
“passive monitoring” hypothesis. On the other hand, a study was conducted by David and Kochhar (2006), they 
argued that various institutional obstacles, such as barriers derived from business relationships, the regulatory 
environment and information processing limitations, may interrupt institutional investors from exercising their 
corporate governance role. 
Leech (2000) argues that many institutional shareholders do not seek control over companies in which they 
invest for many reasons, which include the fear of obtaining price sensitive information, so institutional investors are 
more likely to influence rather than complete control. 
Although, much literature have written about the influence of corporate governance and institutional investment 
in sub-Saharan Africa due to the newly established securities markets and the new trend in institutional investment 
especially the foreign once. Very few studies were conducted concerning corporate governance and institutional 
investment at the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE), was conducted by Maxwell (2011). This  study relates corporate 
governance on a number of institutional investors for companies listed at the NSE by considering board of 
independence as one of governance dimensions, they found that institutional investors is negatively correlated to 
board of independence that weakens the corporate governance and value of institutional investors at all. They 
reported that Nigerian listed companies have corporate governance that affects information disclosure and 
transparency that have an inverse effect on institutional investors. 
Another European study was conducted by Dim Tropouls and Asterion (2010) who examine the influence of 
corporate governance structure (board size, board independence, shareholders representation in audit committee, 
audit committee and audit committee independence) on number and volume of institutional investors for 97 non-financial 
firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange in Greece for the year 2000-2004. They use the modified Jones model to 
measure the two variables of Institutional investment and consistent with Anglo-American countries studies, they 
found that corporate governance structure does not influence institutional investment rather, institutional investment 
influence corporate governance structure. Prior studies provide evidence on the influence of institutional investors on 
corporate governance structure.  Ogbowu (2010) extends this argument by suggesting that institutional investment 
influences corporate governance structure due to their ability to distribute the work load over a greater number of 
observers. The majority of the previous literature supports  this argument, by finding that institutional investment are 
strongly associated with level of corporate governance structure (David and Kochhar, 2006). 
All in all, the vast majority of previous empirical findings suggest that boards with a high preparation of 
independence outside directors enhance the integrity of the financial reporting process and provide assurance to 
shareholders on the quality of reported earnings. However, while the studies from the U.S.A, U.K, Canada and 
Australia, that is Anglo-American countries with slender differences in their institutional environments, advocate for 
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board independence as essential in ensuring financial reporting quality, the Spanish and Asian studies draw attention 
to the argument that different institutional contexts have different needs in corporate governance and there is no one 
model that fits all environments. 
Base on the literature, this paper empirically attempts to answer the following questions. 
1. Can corporate governance structure influence value of institutional investors of quoted Nigerian 
companies? 
2. Does corporate governance structure influence number of institutional investors of quoted Nigerian 
companies? 
3. Is there any difference between the involvement of institutional investors and corporate governance of 
quoted Nigerian companies? 
 
Based on the above mentioned questions, the foregoing discussion provides the context for three important 
hypotheses that track the influence between corporate governance structure and institutional investment, formulated 
in the null form, to wit: 
H01: Corporate governance structure does not have any significant effect on the value of institutional investors of 
quoted Nigerian companies. 
H02: Corporate governance structure does not have any significant influence on number of institutional investors 
of quoted Nigerian companies. 
H03: Institutional Investment does not have any significant influence on corporate governance structure of quoted 
Nigerian companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-1. Conceptual framework of corporate governance structure and institutional investment. 
 
           Source: Conceptualized by the author (Nwaiwu and Dan Jumbo, 2014) 
 
6. Research Methodology 
Numerous studies in the literature have investigated on the relationship between corporate governance and 
institutional investment. Some of the studies are conducted as survey (Aaboan et al., 2006; Brenes et al., 2009), 
while others are performed as empirical analyses. The study sample was drawn from listed companies on the first tier 
of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) as compiled by the NSE Fact Book, using the census method of sample 
selection. The census method eliminates sampling error and provides data on all the individuals in the population 
(Israel, 2009). This approach is in accordance with prior investigations such as Okike (1991), Sanda et al. (2005), 
Chuntad (2005), Liu (2007), Kantudu (2008), and Ogbowu (2014). Further, the adoption of panel data analysis 
model in this longitudinal study imposed the following requisite characteristics on the sample elements: 
1) The companies must have been listed on the first tier of the NSE on or before 1st January 2001 and remained 
listed throughout the five years understudy. 
2) The company’s financial statement must cover the 12 months period ending 31st December of each calendar 
year. This condition is consequent upon the criterion that the observations must be captured in periods with 
fixed and constant intervals between them as espoused by  Patibardla (2006), Omran et al. (2008); Suegoshi 
(2010). 
The general format of the panel data model specification can be expressed as: 
Yit  =  + kxk, i,t + ui, t --------------(1) 
Where by the dimension of cross-sectional units are represented by i and that of time-series is represented by t.  
Yit denotes the institutional Investment measure, which is the dependent variable of the model; k represents the 
parameters to be estimated with K = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, showing the independent variables; Ui, t represents the stochastic 
error term. 
The multiple regression procedure is utilized based on the results of the modified regression test for heter- 
oskedastcity (Woolridge, 2003). Furthermore, the different models used are not found to suffer from serial regression 
based on the results of the Wooldridge test for auto regression (Woolridge, 2003). 
 
Corporate 
Governance Structure 
Board Size (BS) 
Board Independence (BInd) 
Shareholders 
Rep. in Audit Committee (SRAC) 
Size of  Audit Committee (SAC) 
Audit Committee Independence (ACI) 
Institutional investment 
 
Value of Institutional Investors  
(VInInv) 
 
Number of Institutional Investors  
(NInInv) 
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7. Empirical Results 
The central research question to be investigated in this section is whether there is a significant causal link 
between corporate governance structure and institutional investment among quoted Nigerian companies. 
Hypothesis 1: The effect of Corporate Governance Structure on the value of investment in quoted Nigerian 
companies. 
Table-7.1. The effect of Corporate Governance Structure on the value of Institutional Investment in quoted Nigerian companies 
Variables/Test Statistic Linear Exponential Semi-Log Double-Log 
Constant 3.936E8* 
(.695) 
16.883*** 
(8.979) 
-2.215E9*** 
(-3.857) 
9.270*** 
(4.981) 
X1:  Board Size 3.183E7* 
(1.490) 
.030* 
(.423) 
3.127E8* 
(1.491) 
.182* 
(.268) 
X2:  Board Independence -1.6344E8* 
(-.407) 
-.959* 
(-.719) 
-1.160E8* 
(-.506) 
-.810* 
(-1.091) 
X3:  Shareholders Representatives   in 
Audit Committee 
1.205E8* 
(.194) 
-.388* 
(-.944) 
3.365E8* 
.915 
-1.682* 
(-1.411) 
X4: Size of Audit Committee 1.402E8* 
(1.666) 
1.062*** 
(3.801) 
6.780E8* 
(1.496) 
6.025*** 
(4.101) 
X5: Audit Committee Independence -1.740E9*** 
(-2.878) 
-2.870* 
(-1.430) 
-1.280E9*** 
(12.805) 
-1.991* 
(-1.346) 
R:  .697 .726 .701 .744 
R
2
 .486 .527 .491 .554 
Adjusted R
2
 .388 .436 .394 .468 
Std Error of the Estimate 3.10854E8 1.03200 3.09338E8 1.00260 
F – ratio 4.924*** 5.801*** 5.024*** 6.456*** 
Durbin – Watson 1.862 2.455 1.828 2.407 
            Source: Extracted from Panel Data 2006-2010. 
              Note: *** = Significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; and *= significant at 10% and above. T-values are shown in parenthesis.  
 
 
Based on the number of significant variables and the statistical values of the test statistic, the Double-log form 
yielded the best fit and is according used in our discussion. The function produced an r of .744 indicating a strong 
influence between corporate governance  structure on the value of investment in quoted Nigerian companies and the 
identified predictors (x1, x2, ----x5). With an r
2
 of .554, our results that Corporate Governance Structure accounts for 
55.4% of changes in Institutional investment and 44.6% due to other factors. The appropriateness of the model 
specification is further highlighted by the F-ratio of 6.456 which is significant at 1% probability level. However, 
board independence, shareholders representatives in audit committee are all shown to have insignificant effect on and 
are negatively correlated with, the value of institutional investment. This finding is consistent in previous studies by 
Bushee and Goodman (2007) who found a positive causal link between corporate governance structure and 
institutional investment in Japan. 
Hypothesis 2:  Effect of Corporate Governance Structure on Number of Institutional Investors in quoted Nigerian 
companies. 
In terms of the number of significant variables and the statistical values of the test statistic, the exponential 
function yielded the best fit and is accordingly used in our discussion. This function produced an r of .489 indicating 
a weak positive influence between corporate governance structures on number of institutional investors. With r
2
 of 
.240. The study evidenced that only 24.0% of variations in the number of institutional investors’ changes is attributed 
to changes in the existing corporate governance structure. F-ratio of 1.638 was not significant highlighting the 
inappropriateness of the model specification. The result revealed that board size, board independence, size of audit 
committee, audit committee independence is not significant determinants of the number of institutional investors. 
However, only shareholders representatives in audit committee were significant at 5% level. 
 
Table-7.2. Effect of Corporate Governance Structure on number of Institutional Investors in quoted Nigerian companies. 
Variables/Test Statistic Linear Exponential Semi-Log Double-Log 
Constant 2.720* 
(1.410) 
1.365* 
(1.885) 
1.922* 
(.970) 
.881* 
(1.185) 
X1:  Board Size -.081* 
(-1.114) 
-.040* 
(-1.461) 
-.727* 
(-1.003) 
-.386) 
(-1.420) 
X2:  Board Independence -908* 
(.663) 
.267* 
(.519) 
.599* 
(.757) 
.201* 
(.678) 
X3:  Shareholders Representatives   in 
Audit Committee 
-.861* 
(-2.043) 
-.389** 
(-2.458) 
-2.320* 
(-1.827) 
-1.057** 
(-2.219) 
X4: Size of Audit Committee .536* 
(1.870) 
.210* 
(1.950) 
2.774* 
(1.772) 
1.014* 
(1.881) 
X5: Audit Committee Independence -.579* 
(-.281) 
-.442* 
(-.571) 
-.905* 
(-.574) 
-.564* 
(-.954) 
R:  .433 .489 .417 .477 
R
2
 .188 .240 .174 .227 
Adjusted R
2
 .032 .093 .015 .079 
Std Error of the Estimate 1.05907 .39738 1.06800 .40055 
F – ratio 1.203* 1.638* 1.096* 1.530* 
Durbin – Watson 2.294 2.308 2.370 2.403 
              Source: Extracted from Panel Data 2006-2010.  
               Note: *** = Significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; and *= significant at 10% and above. T-values are shown in parenthesis.  
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We therefore accept our null hypothesis and conclude that Corporate Governance Structure does not have 
significant influence on number of institutional investors in Nigerian companies. These findings offer support to 
previous studies on corporate governance structure our result is not in concordance with the findings of Bushee et al. 
(2007). But the test result for testing H01- H02 does not confirm with the existence of any significant influence of 
corporate governance structure on any of the components of institutional investment. The values of the Durbin-
Watson statistic are consistently above 2, thereby conforming the existence of multi-collinearnity. We accordingly 
investigated the effect of institutional investment on corporate governance structure and the result is as shown below: 
Hypothesis 3: Effect of Institutional Investment on Corporate Governance Structure. 
 
Table-7.3. Effect of Institutional Investment on Corporate Governance Structure of quoted Nigerian companies. 
Variables/Test statistic  Eigen 
Coefficients/ (t-values) Tolerance VIF value 
Constant 12.682*** (8.011) - - 3.198 
Value of institutional investment 1.884EA*** (1.564) .911 1.097 .547 
Number of institutional investors -.338** (-.752) .964 1.037 .196 
Share % holding by institutional investors .071*** (3.244) .925 1.082 .059 
R .757    
R
2
 .573    
Adjusted R
2
 .549    
Standard error of the estimate 80.77524    
f-ratio 5.400***    
Durbin-Watson .712    
                   Source: Extracted from Panel Data 2006-2010.  
                   Note: *** = Significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; and *= significant at 10% and above. T-values are shown in parenthesis.  
 
 
The able table 7.3 provides a puzzling result. Contrary to our expectations and results in H01 – H03, it is 
institutional investment that affects CGS with about 57.3% of the changes in the later being attributable to variations 
in institutional investment. Two of the three measures of institutional investment were shown to have positively and 
significant influences on Corporate Governance Structure. Thus, increases in the value and percentage – holding of 
institutional investors are most likely to strengthen Corporate Governance Structure. This result stands out as a major 
contribution of this work, with strong advocacy for enabling environment to attract more institutional investments in 
Nigerian companies. 
 
8. Concluding Remarks and Recommendations 
The investigation attempts to add to the literature by providing evidence from an emerging market on the 
influence of corporate governance structure and institutional investment. One of the distinguishing features of this 
study is the development of additional models to consider the influence of institutional investment. Furthermore, the 
use of panel data analysis enhances the results by empirically investigating the issue from both a cross-sectional and 
a time series dimension. 
The main motivation of this study is the lack of empirical evidence regarding issues of corporate governance 
structure and institutional investment for Nigerian listed companies. Therefore, the results of our study are critical in 
terms of providing insight into the influence of corporate governance structure and institutional investment, which is 
a topic receiving considerable attention after the recent financial reporting scandals. 
From the previous analyses, institutional investors are the majority owners of most corporations listed on NSE. 
The results presented in this paper show contradiction findings. In one hand, it revealed a significant positive effect 
between corporate governance structure and number of institutional investors; this result was found in 2004-2007, 
but not in 2008. On the other hand, a significant negative effect was between corporate governance structure and 
volume of institutional investors in 2005-2008 only. These results can be explained in light with some dimensions; 
Board size, Board Independence, share holders representative in audit committee, audit independence and audit 
committee independence. The results are somewhat consistent with other studies but are inconclusive findings, 
results for number of institutional investors and corporate governance structure are consistent with existing evidence, 
and other variables (volume and percentage holdings) results are somewhat consistent or less consistent due to the 
weak efficiency in the securities market in Nigeria. 
 
9. Recommendation 
 Given more attention to the large institutional investment, since there is a positive relationship between 
corporate governance structure and the whole number of institutional investors. And a negative between 
corporate governance structure and volume of institutional investors. 
 It is important to work on knowledge and informative programmes about the good influence of the large 
number of institutional investors and the bad influence of few large institutional investors who controls boards 
of Investee Company, enhancing low governance practices.  
 To have better monitoring by large institutional investors, they set on board of investee companies in order to 
have wider bird’s view image 
 The capital market authority and NSE should set regulations that prevent a percentage holding of share in 
companies to protect the control by few institutional investors. 
 The study also recommends further investigations into the influence of corporate governance structure and 
institutional investors, using larger sample size, covering more years, and including particularly the banking 
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sectors that has witnessed major reforms since 2005 and plays a critical role in the economic development of 
Nigeria. 
 
10. Contribution to Knowledge 
This work contributes to knowledge in the following ways: 
1. It brings into empirical focus the governance role of the investment horizon of institutional investors. 
2. The study presents a model specification which incorporates the interplay of the dynamics of corporate 
governance structure, institutional investment and financial performance.  
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